



British Sikh Report

AN INSIGHT INTO THE BRITISH SIKH COMMUNITY

2025



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Executive Summary

Welcome to the British Sikh Report 2025. This is the eleventh in our series of strategic documents created by Sikhs about Sikhs, and for everyone with an interest in the lives of Sikhs in Britain. The data was collected in late 2025, hence its name.

Our last edition was published in January 2024. Over the last 24 months, the United Kingdom has seen an increase in far-right rhetoric and attacks on Sikhs which have led to fear amongst British Sikhs at levels not seen for decades. The impact on how Sikhs view their place in modern Britain is explored within this edition.

BSR is a very well established source of robust and unrivalled statistical information about Sikhs living in Britain. This highly influential document has been quoted by MPs and Peers, referred to in research and white papers regarding faith in modern society, and used by public authorities and private companies in identifying the needs of British Sikhs.

Our highly experienced team has worked with a wide range of Sikh organisations reflecting the diversity of the community throughout the country to create the questionnaire and collect the data. We are deeply grateful to everyone who has helped us along the way and volunteered their valuable time in putting this together.

The findings from the British Sikh Report 2025 include:

- *67% believe Sikh military contributions are not recognised by the wider public.*
- *59% support or strongly support a family member or friend joining the UK Armed Forces.*
- *At the 2024 General Election, British Sikhs voted as follows:*
 - *40% Labour*
 - *20% Conservative*
 - *5% Green*
 - *4% Lib Dem*
 - *3% Reform*
- *If there was an Election now, British Sikhs would vote as follows:*
 - *18% Labour*
 - *18% Conservative*
 - *8% Green*
 - *7% Reform*
 - *6% Lib Dem*
- *46% are dissatisfied with the current political representation of Sikhs in the UK.*
- *Out of those British Sikhs' relationships that have ended, 45% of males ended the relationship due to differences in values or life goals, whilst 45% of females did so due to emotional or physical abuse.*
- *Over one in four (26%) have experienced a miscarriage or stillbirth.*
- *54% are afraid that Sikh communities could be misunderstood or targeted due to geopolitical tensions involving India.*
- *49% are concerned about the rising anti-Sikh sentiment or confusion about Sikh identity.*

British Sikhs have long been a confident and proud community with a strong distinct identity, but at the present time, they are experiencing unique fears and concerns. This document offers a rare and unparalleled insight into the thoughts and opinions of a community questioning its own sense of belonging.

We hope that you find the British Sikh Report 2025 revealing, eye-opening, and most of all, informative.

Jasvir Singh CBE

January 2026

Jasvir Singh CBE

Article: Race, Identity, and the British Sikh Community in a Polarised United Kingdom

Jagbir Jhutti-Johal OBE, Professor of Sikh Studies, University of Birmingham

British Sikh Report 2025

Introduction

In recent years, debates surrounding race, identity, and belonging in the United Kingdom have intensified. While increased attention to these issues has created opportunities for public dialogue, it has also coincided with heightened polarisation, social anxiety, and contested understandings of national identity.

The 2024 United Kingdom riots, marked by far-right and anti-immigration unrest across multiple English towns and cities in late July and early August, alongside a noticeable rise in the display of the St George's flag across England during the summer and autumn of

2025, illustrate deep fractures in national narratives of belonging and citizenship.¹ While supporters frame such displays as expressions of national pride, critics link them to anti-immigration sentiment and protests.² Together, these developments have intensified longstanding questions about who is perceived as belonging in Britain and under what conditions, while exposing minority communities to heightened fear and violence within their local environments. The British Sikh community in 2025 experienced renewed racialisation, misrecognition, and insecurity, despite their long-standing presence and contributions to British social life.

Violence, Visibility, and Community Impact

In 2025 a series of racially and religiously aggravated assaults in the West Midlands deeply unsettled Sikh communities, particularly Sikh women. These incidents did not occur in isolation but were shaped by the same broader socio-political climate marked by contested debates over immigration, demographic change, cultural identity, and difference.

In September 2025, a British-born Sikh woman in her twenties was raped in Oldbury in an attack treated by West Midlands Police as racially aggravated, following reports that the perpetrators told her, "You don't belong in this country, get out" (Express & Star, 2025).³ The assault prompted widespread concern across Sikh communities nationally. Emergency meetings were convened in local gurdwaras, and a public demonstration of solidarity drew hundreds, reflecting perceptions of a rise in anti-Sikh hate crime (Sky News, 2025).⁴

Further incidents followed. In October 2025, another Sikh woman in her twenties was attacked and raped in Walsall, leading to charges of rape and religiously aggravated assault (The Guardian)⁵. Additional reports documented a racially aggravated assault

on a Sikh woman in Wolverhampton involving a stun device, alongside an earlier incident in August in which two elderly turban-wearing Sikh men were violently attacked in broad daylight in the same city.⁶

These cases underscore the role of visibility in racialised violence. Sikh individuals, many of whom are British-born citizens and were targeted due to visible markers of faith, age, and gender. Such incidents challenge assumptions that long-established minority communities are insulated from hostility and demonstrates how racialisation operates independently of legal citizenship or length of residence.

The impact of these events has extended beyond those directly harmed. Sikh women across affected areas have reported altering daily routines, avoiding walking alone, changing travel routes and times, and experiencing heightened fear in public spaces.⁷ For Sikhs, the emotional and psychological consequences of targeting have reshaped how safety is understood and negotiated within families and the community itself.

Racialisation in the Contemporary British Context

While the United Kingdom has long been characterised by diversity, the nature of racial discourse has evolved. Earlier periods focused more explicitly on overt discrimination, whereas contemporary racism increasingly operates through subtler mechanisms, including stereotyping, misinformation, algorithmically amplified online hostility, and cultural misrecognition reinforced by political rhetoric surrounding immigration and grooming gangs.

Periods of social unrest often expose the fragility of social cohesion, positioning British Sikhs in a liminal

space. Frequently framed as a “model minority”, economically successful, law-abiding, and integrated, they are nevertheless marginalised within national discussions of racism and routinely misrecognised within broader racialised narratives. Sikh men, particularly *Amritdhari* (initiated) or *Keshdhari* (not initiated) turban-wearers, are often misidentified as Muslim, a misrecognition that carries tangible consequences in the form of suspicion and hostility.⁸ As a result, British Sikh men may experience racism not for who they are, but for what they are perceived to represent within wider cultural anxieties.⁹

Gender, Visibility and Lived Insecurity

For Sikh women, these dynamics are intensified through intersectionality, shaped by the interaction of gender, race, religion, and cultural identity. *Amritdhari* (initiated) Sikh women who wear the *dastaar* (turban) are also subject to misidentification, as their turban is frequently mistaken for a hijab, leading them to be perceived as Muslim and exposing them to similar forms of suspicion and hostility.

Although incidents of violence against Sikh women in the West Midlands were geographically localised, their impact resonated widely across the community. Fear circulated through family discussions, community networks, and informal channels, shaping everyday practices such as mobility in public spaces, parental guidance on safety, and how young Sikh women negotiate visibility and identity. Even in the absence of direct victimisation, these narratives of violence have produced a collective emotional climate marked by vigilance and caution, significantly shaping the lived experiences of Sikh women.

Despite these conditions of heightened scrutiny and risk, Sikh women continue to navigate both British societal expectations and Punjabi-Sikh cultural norms in ways that are strategic and adaptive. During periods of racial tension, heightened visibility and scrutiny they regulate and modify their behaviour in public spaces in order to minimise attention and reduce the risk of harassment or attack, while also upholding the dignity of their families and the wider Sikh community. What is evident is Sikh women are not defined solely by challenges and constraints. They continue to play a significant role in social change, leading charities, excelling professionally and academically, participating in politics, building businesses, and redefining contemporary Sikh identity. Their leadership challenges frameworks that portray minority women only through vulnerability, instead demonstrating resilience alongside the ongoing negotiation of everyday risks.

Perceived Priorities and Everyday Concerns Among UK Sikhs

Understanding the priorities and everyday concerns of British Sikhs is essential for targeted policy and community support. The British Sikh Report Survey asked respondents what they thought were the most important issues facing Sikhs in the UK today. Table 1.1 indicates that crime and policing (23%) and immigration (22%) are consistently recognised across sex and age groups, reflecting shared anxieties about safety, belonging, and civic inclusion. For Sikhs these concerns are compounded by heightened perceptions of vulnerability linked to visibility and misrecognition amplifying fear and influencing behaviours such as altering travel routes, avoiding public spaces, or increased vigilance. Online hostility and misinformation further exacerbates anxiety,

and reinforces offline fears, with women reporting particular concern about targeting and safety. It is also important to note that repeated demands on the Sikh community to explain their identity, correct misconceptions, and respond to incidents perceived as inadequately addressed by institutions has created emotional fatigue, particularly among younger generations navigating multiple identities.

Inequality and social justice emerges as the most pressing concern overall (29.0%), with women prioritising this more strongly than men (33% vs 25%), while economic issues, including inflation and employment, rank highly for both sexes (29%), particularly men (31%). Healthcare is a greater priority

for women (27% vs 25%), and age-disaggregated data show generational differences: younger Sikhs are particularly concerned with inequality and social justice and education, whereas older groups prioritise healthcare and economic stability.

Collectively, these patterns highlight the intersection of everyday risks, structural inequalities, and perceptions of vulnerability. They underscore the importance of policy interventions that address crime and safety, economic pressures, social recognition, and both the real and perceived threats of targeted hostility and misrecognition of Sikhs.

Table 1.1 Issues facing UK Sikhs	<i>By gender</i>		<i>By age group</i>				Total
	Female	Male	20–34	35–49	50–64	65+	
Inequality and social justice	33%	25%	31%	28%	28%	24%	29%
Economy (e.g., inflation, unemployment)	26%	31%	27%	29%	31%	27%	29%
Healthcare (e.g., NHS, mental health)	27%	25%	20%	27%	31%	29%	26%
Crime and policing	23%	22%	24%	20%	22%	25%	23%
Immigration	23%	20%	22%	22%	20%	21%	22%
Education (e.g., schools, university funding)	15%	19%	15%	18%	16%	16%	17%
International relations (e.g., Brexit, foreign policy)	15%	14%	14%	18%	14%	6%	14%
National security and terrorism	13%	10%	12%	13%	12%	8%	12%
Housing and homelessness	5%	3%	7%	2%	2%	2%	4%
Climate change and environment	2%	3%	1%	1%	4%	4%	2%

Geopolitical Anxiety, Transnational Vulnerability, and Community Visibility

Geopolitical tensions involving India have become an increasingly significant source of concern for British Sikhs¹⁰, particularly where anti-Sikh and inflammatory rhetoric circulates within UK-based online spaces. Such discourse contributes to transnational vulnerability and heightens the risk of localised misrecognition, especially when Sikh political activism is routinely framed through narratives of “extremism.” The circulation of these narratives has been widely perceived as threatening, contributing to heightened anxiety, mistrust, and feelings of marginalisation among British Sikhs, and raising safeguarding concerns in relation to transnational political rhetoric. These international dynamics intersect with domestic anxieties around crime, safety, and social recognition, as identified in Table 1.1, further shaping perceptions of vulnerability, visibility, and community security within the UK. As shown in Table 1.1, this intersection of global political narratives and localised experience amplifies perceived risk and reinforces everyday insecurity for Sikh communities across gender and age groups.

High-profile international developments, including public statements by the former Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau alleging Indian state involvement in transnational repression of Sikhs and the killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar¹¹, the

provision of security to Gurpatwant Singh Pannun in the United States,¹² and allegations surrounding the death of Avtar Singh Khanda¹³ in the UK have heightened anxiety about transnational surveillance, mischaracterisation, and collective suspicion by the Indian and British Government.¹⁴

BSR Survey data (Table 1.2) indicate that over half of British Sikh respondents (54%) fear their communities could be misunderstood or targeted within the UK, with women expressing slightly higher concern than men (56% vs 52%). Anxiety about misinformation and fake news fuelling hostility was reported by 50%, while nearly 49% expressed concern about rising anti-Sikh sentiment or confusion about Sikh identity. Age-disaggregated data show that younger Sikhs (19 and under) are particularly sensitive, with 62% citing fears of misrepresentation or targeting. Transnational concerns are also prominent: 45% worry about the safety of family and friends in Punjab, and 43% are concerned about attacks on Sikh religious sites such as the Golden Temple. Notably, 42% associate these tensions with an increased risk of hate crime or communal hostility within the UK, demonstrating how international political narratives, combined with domestic racialised dynamics, translate into lived fear, heightened visibility, and perceived insecurity across gender and age groups.¹⁵

Table 1.2 What concerns, if any, do you have about how geopolitical tensions involving India may affect Sikhs in the UK?	By gender		By age group				Total
	Female	Male	20–34	35–49	50–64	65+	
Fear that Sikh communities in the UK could be misunderstood or targeted	56%	52%	55%	55%	56%	48%	54%
Worry about misinformation or fake news on social media causing panic or hostility	51%	49%	51%	51%	53%	42%	50%
Concern about rising anti-Sikh sentiment or confusion about Sikh identity	50%	48%	52%	51%	49%	35%	49%
Concern for the safety of family and friends living in Punjab or nearby regions	47%	43%	53%	48%	40%	37%	45%
Concern about attacks on Sikh religious sites in India, such as the Golden Temple	46%	41%	48%	42%	44%	34%	43%
Anxiety over the potential for hate crimes or communal tensions within the UK	45%	39%	46%	44%	44%	29%	42%
Fear that the situation could disrupt visits to Punjab or affect pilgrimage plans	35%	34%	41%	37%	34%	22%	34%
No specific concerns at this time	5%	5%	5%	5%	4%	8%	5%

The patterns of concern highlighted in Tables 1.1 and 1.2, ranging from everyday crime and misrecognition to transnational anxieties, show that British Sikhs navigate vulnerability while maintaining active civic engagement. Table 1.2 highlights the need for effective long term policy measures, and not

reactive measures that address both domestic and transnational drivers of vulnerability. Recognising how geopolitical tensions intersect with localised safety, visibility, and community well-being is critical to safeguarding British Sikhs and mitigating both real and perceived risks of targeting.

Conclusion: Belonging, Citizenship, and Policy Implications

Despite the challenges faced by British Sikhs, Sikh ethical principles such as *seva* (selfless service) and *sarbat da bhala* (welfare of all) continue to provide a foundation for how Sikhs behave and respond to challenges. These principles foster belonging not through assimilation or invisibility, but through active participation, care, and justice for all. They not only provide a model of ethical engagement rooted in Sikh theology but also offer a framework for addressing broader societal challenges affecting all. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Sikh organisations across the UK provided food, personal protective equipment, and essential support to vulnerable populations regardless of background, reinforcing their role as active participants in civic life.¹⁶ Younger Sikhs continue this legacy through visibility in politics, journalism, academia, and activism, challenging reductive narratives and contributing to positive conversations on race, citizenship, and belonging. Thus, Sikhs in Britain often see themselves as British while maintaining their religious and cultural identity, blending both in everyday life rather than choosing one over the other.

Recent incidents targeting Sikh individuals, including elderly turban-wearing men and Sikh women, however, have sadly highlighted that civic contribution and integration do not automatically confer safety. Racialised violence often operates through visibility, gender, and religion, revealing gaps between formal citizenship, social integration, and lived security. In this context, intersectional and preventative approaches to social cohesion are essential.

A central policy priority is the recognition and accurate recording of anti-Sikh hate crimes. Misclassification, often as anti-Muslim incidents due to mistaken identity¹⁷ linked to visible markers such as turbans and beards, obscures the scale of anti-Sikh hate crime, distorts resource allocation, and undermines evidence-based responses which are proportionate, preventative, and inclusive.¹⁸ Mandating consistent Sikh-specific data collection across police forces and national reporting frameworks is foundational for accountability, protection, and equitable governance. Proper data will support targeted funding, victim advocacy, enhanced hate-crime reporting, and safeguarding of Sikh places of worship.

Sikh-led organisations also need to play a critical role in fostering community resilience. Beyond providing culturally competent support, they must invest in gurdwara security and safeguarding and encourage members to report hate crimes and attacks to ensure that Sikh experiences are visible in data collected, recognised, and addressed.

Equally important is a recalibration of public narratives around identity and belonging. Minority communities must be recognised not as conditional members of the nation, but as integral to Britain's past, present, and future. Engaging with Sikh ethical frameworks, particularly *seva*, *sarbat da bhala*, and *chardi kala*¹⁹, can enhance community-based approaches to cohesion, prevention, and justice.

In the Guru Granth Sahib²⁰, the central Sikh scripture, Bhagat Ravidas's vision of *Begumpura*, "the city without sorrow," can be employed as a lens through which to understand and critically evaluate a polarised United Kingdom. *Begumpura* should be understood not as a prescriptive socio-political model, but as a normative moral and spiritual ideal against which current society may be evaluated. Its portrayal of a world without fear, hierarchy, or exclusion, including the absence of "taxes," functions symbolically as a critique of exploitative and coercive structures

rather than as a rejection of collective responsibility. Sikh tradition itself reflects the necessary distinction between spiritual ideal and social reality, providing a foundation for considering how these principles might inform contemporary social and political challenges. For example, the institution of *Daswand*²¹, a voluntary contribution of income for the common good, historically operated as a form of moral obligation supporting institutions such as the Khalsa army and systems of communal welfare.

Begumpura therefore represents an aspirational framework for justice, dignity, and shared belonging, while recognising that contemporary societies, including modern Britain, require complex structures, resources, and compromise. Rather than functioning as a utopian escape, it provides an ethical framework against which entrenched social and economic inequalities, as well as the politics of fear shaping contemporary debates on immigration, difference, and national identity, may be assessed. Viewed in this context, *Begumpura* offers an alternative framework for social cohesion grounded in equality, shared responsibility, and the rejection of conditional belonging, underscoring that addressing violence, misrecognition, and exclusion is not only a matter of policy effectiveness but also of the kind of society Britain ultimately aspires to be.

*Begumpura, "the city without sorrow," is the name of that town.
There is no suffering or anxiety there.
There are no troubles or taxes on commodities.
There is no fear, blemish, or downfall.
Now, I have found this most excellent city.
There is lasting peace and safety there, O Siblings of Destiny.
God's Kingdom is steady, stable, and eternal.
There is no second or third status; all are equal there.
That city is populous and eternally renowned.
Its citizens walk freely, just as they please.
They know the Lord's presence, and none obstruct their path.
Says Ravi Das, the emancipated shoemaker:
Whoever resides in that city is a friend of mine.*

(Bhagat Ravidas, Guru Granth Sahib, Ang 345)²²

Endnotes

- ¹ Godshaw, D. and Singleton, A., 2025. Neither mindless nor legitimate: the racist politics of the 2024 UK riots and the limitations of the carceral response. *Justice, Power and Resistance*, 8(2), pp.237-248.
- ² [England flags spark pride and concern amid anti-immigration protests | Reuters](#) [Accessed 15 December 2025]
- ³ [British-born Sikh woman whose attackers shouted 'you don't belong here' assaulted and raped in Oldbury during racially-motivated attack | Express & Star](#) [Accessed 13 December 2025]
- ⁴ [Hundreds gather to show solidarity with Sikh woman raped 'in racially aggravated attack' | UK News | Sky News](#) [Accessed 13 December 2025]
- ⁵ [Man charged with rape and religiously aggravated assault of Sikh woman in Walsall | UK news | The Guardian](#)
- ⁶ [UK News | 2 Sikh Men Racially Abused In UK - YouTube](#) [Accessed 13 December 2025]
- ⁷ [West Midlands: Women afraid to be out in public after racially aggravated rapes - BBC News And MPs express shock after alleged racially motivated rape of Sikh woman | West Midlands | The Guardian And 'The fear is real': how Midlands attacks have changed Sikh women's daily lives | UK news | The Guardian And I'm A Sikh Woman From The West Midlands. Fear Is Making Us Change How We Live | British Vogue, And West Midlands Sikh temples handing out rape alarms to community - BBC News](#) [Accessed 13 December 2025]
- ⁸ Jhutti-Johal, J. (2024) [How Does Hate Speech Directed at One Community Affect Another Community? - Talk About: Law and Religion](#) [Accessed 13 December 2025]
- ⁹ Jhutti-Johal, J. and Singh, H., 2019. *Racialization, Islamophobia and mistaken identity: The Sikh experience*. Routledge. And Jhutti-Johal, J., 2023. Racism or Mistaken Identity? Anti-Sikh Hate Crimes and the Need for Better Recording and Monitoring. In *The Sikh World* (pp. 450-462). Routledge.
- ¹⁰ See [Hindu mobs attack Sikhs in London](#); And [Canada-India row puts spotlight on Sikh activism in UK - BBC News And What is Khalistan and why India's issue has stirred tensions in Canada | National Post](#) [Accessed 13 December 2025]
- ¹¹ [Trudeau accuses India's government of involvement in killing of Canadian Sikh leader | CBC News](#) [Accessed 13 December 2025]
- ¹² [Gurpatwant Singh Pannu: US charges ex-India agent in Sikh separatist murder plot - BBC News](#) [Accessed 13 December 2025]
- ¹³ [Sikh activist who died in UK could have been poisoned, says pathologist | Birmingham | The Guardian](#) [Accessed 13 December 2025]
- ¹⁴ [MPs to meet security minister over safety of Sikhs living in Britain - BBC News and Sikhs living in US, UK and Canada fear surveillance by Indian agents, informants - Asia News Network](#) [Accessed 13 December 2025]
- ¹⁵ See Jhutti-Johal, J and S, Hundal, (2019) *The changing nature of activism amongst Sikhs in the UK today - GOV.UK* And Bowden, Olivia. (2024) ['What's happening in Canada?': clashes between Hindus and Sikhs spark fears of growing divisions | Canada | The Guardian](#) [Accessed 13 December 2025]
- ¹⁶ [BSR-Report-2022.pdf](#) [Accessed 13 December 2025]
- ¹⁷ The Sikh turban has frequently been misidentified as a *keffiyeh* associated with Islam and which have now become associated with Islamist militancy, a misconception that intensified in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. As documented in media reporting, including CNN, this mistaken association has contributed to Sikhs being targeted for harassment and violence despite having no connection to Islamist extremism. [After 9/11, turbans made Sikhs targets | CNN](#) [Accessed 13 December 2025]
- ¹⁸ Also at present, Sikhs are frequently subsumed under broad ethnic categories such as "Asian" or "Indian," while religious hate-crime data often lacks sufficient disaggregation. This results in a structural data gap that obscures the prevalence and nature of anti-Sikh hate and therefore undermining evidence-based policymaking.
- ¹⁹ "*Nanak naam chardi kalaa, tayray bhanai sarbat ka bhalaa*" is the closing line from the Sikh Ardas which is recited by Sikhs daily at the end of their prayers.
- ²⁰ The Guru Granth Sahib is the Eternal Guru for Sikhs. The Guru Granth Sahib focuses on the 'oneness' of humanity and the universality of religious teachings. This is demonstrated by the inclusion of the names of God from other traditions, for example, Hari, Ram, Allah and Khuda. Guru Gobind Singh refers to naming of God in one of his verses: "Who can say all His Names." The scripture also includes the compositions not just of the Sikh Gurus (Guru Nanak, Guru Angad Dev, Guru Amar Das, Guru Ram Das, Guru Arjan Dev and Guru Tegh Bahadur), but also of medieval saints and mystics belonging to diverse social, religious and cultural traditions (Jaidev, Namdev, Trilochan, Parmanand, Sadna, Ramanand, Kabir, Pipa, Beni, Dhanna, Sain, Farid, Surdas, Bhikhan, and Ravidas).
- ²¹ *Daswand* refers to the practice of voluntarily giving one-tenth of one's income or earnings for the common good. It reflects a Sikh understanding that individual prosperity is inseparable from communal well-being.
- ²² [Sri Guru Granth Sahib Ji :- Ang : 345 :- ਸ੍ਰੀ ਗੁਰੂ ਗ੍ਰੰਥ ਸਾਹਿਬ ਜੀ :- searchgurbani.com](#) [Accessed 13 December 2025]



Article: British Sikhs and the Armed Forces

Major Daljinder Singh Virdee MBE VR, The Sikh Military Foundation

British Sikh Report 2025

Introduction – Armed Forces & Sikh Identity

The Sikh martial ethos is a living expression of faith, duty, and strength. Rooted in the concept of *Sant-Sipahi* (Saint-Soldier), Sikh identity has long combined spiritual discipline with a commitment to justice and the protection of others. From the battlefields of the eighteenth century to the trenches of the First World War and the jungles of Burma in the Second World War, Sikhs have played an outsized role in the defence of freedom, guided by the principle of *Degh Tegh Fateh*, namely being victorious in serving others as well as in battle.

Yet today, this proud tradition stands at a critical crossroads. Despite deep historical ties, Sikh representation in the British Armed Forces remains disproportionately low. Estimates suggest that only around 200 practising Sikhs currently serve across the Navy, Army, and Royal Air Force, a figure starkly at odds with both the size of the Sikh population and its historic contribution.


To better understand this gap between legacy and present-day engagement, the Sikh Military Foundation worked with the British Sikh Report team to include a focused set of questions in the 2025 survey on attitudes, awareness, trust, and barriers related to Armed Forces service. The central question we wanted to answer was whether low Sikh participation reflects a lack of interest in military service, or whether it is driven by gaps in recognition, awareness, and confidence in inclusion.

The decline in Sikh military engagement risks weakening a vital thread of Sikh heritage within British public life, and this section of the British Sikh Report is a step towards understanding the causes of this disengagement and clarifying what needs to be done to ensure a greater Sikh military presence in the future.

Recognition of contributions of Sikhs by the general public

Figure 2.1
Do you think the contributions of Sikhs to the UK Armed Forces, both historically and today, are well recognised by the general public?

by gender ■ Female ■ Male ■ Total



The survey asked respondents whether they thought that the contributions of Sikhs to the UK Armed Forces, both historically and today, are well recognised by the general public.

The results showed the following:


- Two thirds (67%) of British Sikhs believe Sikh military contributions are not recognised by the wider public.
- Only 19% believe these contributions are recognised (15% of females and 24% of males).
- The Support Index (proportion of Yes responses among those with a clear opinion) is just 23%, showing low support relative to opposition.
- The Sentiment Polarity Score (SPS – those saying “Yes” minus those saying “No”) is -47, indicating a strongly negative overall sentiment toward public recognition of Sikh service.

The data reveals a clear and widespread perception among British Sikhs that their community's military service is overlooked and undervalued. Despite a long and distinguished record of contribution to the UK Armed Forces, two-thirds feel this legacy is not recognised by the public. This points to a systemic

absence in national education, remembrance, and institutional narratives, and poses serious questions for defence and government about how acknowledging the past shapes engagement and representation in the present.

Figure 2.2

Are you aware that a wide range of professional roles, such as Doctors, Dentists, Pharmacists, Engineers, Lawyers, and more, are available in the UK Armed Forces?



The survey asked respondents if they are aware that a wide range of professional roles (e.g. doctors, engineers, lawyers) are available in the UK Armed Forces?

- 24% of respondents reported being strongly aware of professional career opportunities beyond combat roles.
- 34% selected "Somewhat aware," indicating partial awareness or low confidence in their understanding.
- 31% were either completely or somewhat unaware of such roles, suggesting low salience or disengagement rather than positive awareness.


This suggests that the UK Armed Forces are still widely perceived through a combat-centric lens, obscuring opportunities in medicine, engineering, law, cyber, logistics, and other specialist fields. Given that British Sikhs are already strongly represented in many of these professions in civilian life, this represents a missed alignment opportunity.

For defence and government stakeholders, improving awareness of professional roles is clearly a high-leverage and low-risk intervention. Targeted communication, credible Sikh role models in specialist roles, and engagement through educational and professional networks may result in increased levels of interest and application rates.

Taken together, the data indicates that the depth of knowledge of non-combat career pathways is shallow and uneven

Figure 2.3

How strongly would you support a family member or friend joining the UK Armed Forces today?



Respondents were asked how strongly would you support a family member or friend joining the UK Armed Forces (Navy, Army or Air Force) today?


- A clear majority (59%) of British Sikh respondents support or strongly support a family member or friend joining the UK Armed Forces.
- Support Index (SI): 79.7% - Among respondents with a clear opinion, nearly four in five would support Armed Forces service.
- Neutrality Index (NI): 24% - Nearly one quarter remain uncommitted.
- Among those expressing a clear view, support is strong (Support Index 80%), and overall sentiment is decisively positive (Sentiment Polarity Score is +44).

- Only 15% would oppose a family member joining the Armed Forces. The Opposition Index (OI), measuring the percentage of those expressing a clear opinion, is 20% - opposition is a clear minority position.

The data suggests that British Sikhs broadly accept the Armed Forces service as a legitimate and respectable employer, but active endorsement cannot be assumed. This is where the neutral group is strategically important, because with improved visible representation and credible reassurance around inclusivity and career value, it may be possible to push this 24% of British Sikhs towards active support.

Figure 2.4

How important is the history and legacy of Sikhs in the British Armed Forces in influencing your opinion on military service?



The survey asked respondents how important is the history and legacy of Sikhs in the British Armed Forces in influencing their opinion on military service today

- 81% of respondents said that this was very important or somewhat important.
- Only 6% said this was not very important or not important at all. Only a very small minority actively dismiss the relevance of Sikh military history.
- The Importance Index, calculated as positive responses divided by all those with a clear opinion, is 93%. Among respondents with a clear view, over nine in ten consider Sikh military history important in shaping attitudes to service today.
- Sentiment Polarity Score (SPS – positive responses minus negative responses, (81-6)) is +75, indicating an exceptionally strong positive sentiment toward the importance of historical legacy.

- A relatively small 12% reported a neutral opinion, suggesting that views are well-formed rather than uncertain.

An overwhelming 81% of British Sikh respondents state that the history and legacy of Sikh service in the British Armed Forces is important in shaping their views on military service today. This includes a clear majority (59%) who regard it as *very important*.

The Importance Index of 93% demonstrates near-consensus among those expressing a view, while the very low Dismissal Index (6%) confirms that historical legacy is widely regarded as relevant and meaningful.

This finding directly contextualises earlier results. While Table 2.1 shows that Sikhs feel their contributions are poorly recognised by the wider public, Table 2.4 demonstrates that within the Sikh community, historical service remains a powerful reference point that positively influences attitudes toward military service.



The BSR survey asked respondents what they thought were barriers that discourage Sikhs from joining the British Armed Forces, and respondents could choose more than one factor.

Table 2.5b shows the detailed results for all the suggested barriers.

Table 2.5a shows that Sikh underrepresentation in the British Armed Forces is not primarily driven by moral opposition to military service. The fear of bullying, racism, or lack of inclusivity (80%) directly aligns with other findings of low trust and uncertainty around accommodation. Concerns about maintaining Sikh identity (73%) further reinforce this confidence gap. Structural challenges such as family separation (77%), career progression (60%), and lifestyle risk (63%) are significant, but they do not operate in isolation. Where trust and inclusion are uncertain, these sacrifices are perceived as less acceptable.

Crucially, ideological objections to military service (57%) are seen to be the least important barrier here. This challenges any assumption that Sikhs disengage

Table 2.5a	
Barrier	Net Barrier ("A big barrier" + "Somewhat of a barrier")
Fear of bullying, racism, or lack of inclusivity	80%
Frequent relocations and family separation	77%
Maintaining Sikh identity (kes, dastaar, kirpan)	73%
Historical or political issues (e.g. colonialism, 1984)	69%
Cultural or family discouragement	68%
Lack of awareness of career opportunities	67%
Perceptions the Armed Forces are not fair or inclusive	65%
Risk of injury/death and military lifestyle	63%
Job security and long-term career progression	60%
Ethical or moral objections to war	57%

due to opposition to war or military ethics. The data instead indicates a risk-based calculation shaped by identity security, fairness, and long-term stability.


To summarise, the principal barriers to Sikh participation are institutional confidence and cultural safety, not rejection of military service or values. Until concerns around inclusion, identity protection, and fairness are visibly and consistently addressed, outreach alone will not convert positive sentiment into participation. Conversely, tackling these barriers directly would remove the most powerful deterrents identified by the community itself.

Figures 2.5b Barriers to joining the Armed Forces


by gender Female Male Total

by age group 20-34 35-49 50-64 65+ Total


Lack of awareness about career opportunities in the Armed Forces




Concerns about job security and long-term career progression




Concerns about maintaining Sikh identity (e.g., kes, dastar, kirpan)



Frequent relocations and family separation



Cultural or family expectations, including discouragement from relatives or friends



A big barrier
Somewhat of a barrier
Neutral (neither a barrier nor not a barrier)
Not much of a barrier
Not a barrier at all
Prefer not to say


A big barrier
Somewhat of a barrier
Neutral (neither a barrier nor not a barrier)
Not much of a barrier
Not a barrier at all
Prefer not to say

Figures 2.5b Barriers to joining the Armed Forces (continued)


by gender Female Male Total

by age group 20-34 35-49 50-64 65+ Total


Ethical or moral concerns (e.g., opposition to war or military interventions)




Fear of bullying, racism, or lack of inclusivity




Risk of injury or death in combat, and the lifestyle demands of military service



Historical or political issues (e.g., British colonialism, events of 1984)



Perceptions that the British Armed Forces are not fair or inclusive discourage Sikhs from joining




The survey asked respondents whether they believed that the British Armed Forces provide adequate religious and cultural accommodations for Sikhs. Figure 2.6 shows the results.

Figure 2.6

Do you believe the British Armed Forces provide adequate religious and cultural accommodations for Sikhs? (e.g., uniform policies, dietary requirements, places of worship)

by gender ■ Female ■ Male ■ Total



Only 12% of British Sikh respondents believe the Armed Forces fully accommodate Sikh religious and cultural needs. Within this, only 6% of females believe this to be the case, compared with 17% of males.

A further 28% acknowledge partial accommodation, this is explicitly qualified by a perceived need for improvement. Again, there is a difference between perceptions of females (23%) and males (33%).

The most striking finding is the very high level of uncertainty (49%). This reflects a lack of clear, trusted knowledge about how Sikh identity is accommodated in practice. In effect, almost half the community


cannot confidently say whether the Armed Forces are inclusive or not. Among respondents with a clear view, the Accommodation Support Index of 80% suggests that where awareness exists, perceptions are generally positive. However, this positive signal is undermined at population level by low visibility, inconsistent messaging, and limited lived or observed experience.

Taken together, the data indicates that the Armed Forces' accommodation of Sikh religious practice is poorly understood, ineffectively communicated, and insufficiently demonstrated. On the whole, British Sikhs are just not sure.

Figure 2.7

How much trust do you have in the British Armed Forces to be a fair and inclusive employer for Sikhs?

by gender ■ Female ■ Male ■ Total



Respondents were asked how much trust they have in the British Armed Forces to be a fair and inclusive employer for Sikhs.

Only 34% of British Sikh respondents express trust in the British Armed Forces as a fair and inclusive employer, while 28% express active distrust. A further 35% are neutral or unsure, highlighting widespread uncertainty.

The Trust Index of 55% (positive responses divided by all with a clear opinion) indicates that even among those with a clear opinion, trust is fragile and contested. The near-balanced Sentiment Polarity Score (+6) makes clear that whilst positive sentiment exists, it is narrow and easily eroded.

Notably, strong trust is rare. Only 10% report a "great deal of trust," while 28% express little or no trust at all. This distribution suggests that confidence in institutional fairness and inclusivity is limited in depth, even where it exists.


Taken alongside the information in Figure 2.6, the pattern is clear. Where accommodation is poorly understood and inconsistently visible, trust does not consolidate. Uncertainty around religious and cultural inclusion translates directly into hesitation about fairness, progression, and equal treatment.

We asked British Sikhs what would help make a career in the Armed Forces more appealing to Sikhs. Respondents could select more than one option.

Figure 2.8
What would help make Armed Forces a career choice more appealing to Sikhs?

by gender

■ Female
■ Male
□ Total



The data provides obvious and prioritised guidance on what would make Armed Forces careers more appealing to Sikhs. The strongest drivers are visible Sikh role models in leadership (54%) and greater awareness of Sikh military history (52%), followed closely by stronger protection of Sikh religious identity (49%).

Targeted recruitment (44%) and community engagement (36%) are important, but respondents place greater weight on substance over messaging. Sikhs do not want more outreach. Instead, they want proof that Sikh identity is recognised and protected within the Armed Forces, thus allowing Sikhs to progress to all levels within the institution.

Crucially, only 5% state that military service is unappealing regardless of changes. This confirms that there are clear and achievable conditions under which service would become more attractive to British Sikhs.

The pathway to improved engagement is to recognise history, protect identity, and make Sikh leadership visible. Done credibly, these actions would ensure that existing goodwill can be nurtured into confidence, advocacy, and increased participation.

Conclusion: A Legacy Present, but a Confidence Gap

British Sikhs remain deeply connected to their martial history and heritage. The legacy of Sikh service in the British Armed Forces continues to shape attitudes toward military service today, meaning that the foundations for Sikh participation remain strong.

However, this legacy is not translating into engagement or recruitment. Two-thirds of British Sikhs believe Sikh military contributions are not recognised by the wider public, and awareness of modern Armed Forces career pathways is limited. As a result, military service is still widely perceived through a narrow, combat-centric lens.

While most British Sikhs would support a family member or friend joining the Armed Forces, this support is often conditional rather than enthusiastic. Trust in the Armed Forces as a fair and inclusive employer is fragile, and uncertainty around religious and cultural accommodation remains high. The

strongest deterrents are not ethical opposition to military service, but concerns about identity protection, discrimination, family impact, and institutional fairness.

Crucially, the community is explicit about what would change this. Visible Sikh leadership, stronger recognition of Sikh military history, and credible protection of Sikh religious identity are the most powerful enablers of engagement. Only a small minority reject military service outright.

Sikh underrepresentation in the British Armed Forces is down to a confidence gap driven by under-recognition, low visibility, and uncertainty about inclusion. Addressing these issues would reconnect the Armed Forces with a community whose values remain strongly aligned with military service, both historically and today.

British Sikh Report 2025: Survey Introduction

British Sikh Report 2025

This is the eleventh British Sikh Report (BSR), providing a much-needed snapshot of the lives of Sikhs in Britain, collecting their views on topical issues. 2025's survey received about 1,900 responses spread across the United Kingdom, providing a comprehensive sample of British Sikhs, including about 500 which were only partially completed. The survey was primarily conducted online, as in previous years, but also with a concerted effort to reach those without internet access. Responses were monitored and particular areas of shortfall were targeted to ensure that the overall sample is representative of Sikhs in Britain in terms of age group, gender, marital status and region. All responses were scrutinised and validated by applying a range of checks, and several were rejected because they were assessed to be false. The sample distribution was then assessed against the information on British Sikhs available from the 2021 Census, and weighting factors calculated to adjust the sample by age group and gender, to align with the Census distribution of these demographics. The resultant weighted sample is considered to be a robust and reliable representation of British Sikhs.

The BSR aims to collect British Sikhs' views on various aspects of life. This year's survey has again

focused on a range of issues that are affecting the lives of British Sikhs, including employment and education and political engagement. We also cover issues that are often not discussed, such as family and personal relationships and the experience of child loss through still births. The report also looks at the impact of events in Punjab and India as a whole upon Sikhs living in the UK.

The BSR continues to collect basic demographic information on age, gender, marital status, disability and place of residence, as well as on identity, ethnicity and whether respondents are Amritdhari or not. We also collect information on place of birth and first arrival to Britain if not born here.

We now have several years' worth of raw data about the Sikh community and we are looking to work with academics and universities in order to take longer term deeper dives into what the data reveal about British Sikhs.

Sections 4 – 8 of this report summarise the results of the information collected through the BSR 2025 survey questionnaire, although some results are also included in the two articles at the beginning.

DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE SURVEY

The following statistics are based on the sample after it was adjusted to the Census distributions by age group and gender.

About 50% of the weighted responses were from women, 49% from men, and about 1 per cent preferred not to declare their gender.

4% of the responses were from those aged 19 or less, 28% from 20–34 year olds, 32% from those aged 35–49, 21% from those aged 50–64, and 15% from those aged 65 and above. We would like to increase the sample of the elderly, but this is not considered to have significant effects on the results of the survey in terms of the topics covered. Results for those aged "19 or less" are not shown separately in the report due to small sample size.

Around 33% of Sikhs responding live in London, and 20% in West Midlands. The regions with the next largest Sikh population are the South East, with 17%, and East Midlands with 9%.

About 63% of respondents are married, and 21% are single (never married or been in a significant relationship). 6% said that they are divorced or separated, and 3% widowed. Over 1% said that they are cohabiting (living together without being married) and nearly 3% said that they are in a relationship but not living together.

93% of respondents said that they were heterosexual, 2% said that they were in an LGBT+ category, and 5% declined to declare their sexual orientation.


Amritdhari Sikhs

The survey asked respondents whether they were a practising Amritdhari Sikh (Figure 3.1). 13% said that they are (9% of females and 17% of males). By age, the group aged 65 or more included the highest percentage of Amritdharis, at 20%. 14% of those aged 20–34 are Amritdharis, compared with 11% in the groups aged 35–39 and 50–64. This suggests that younger Sikhs are increasing in confidence in exerting their religious identity.

4% of respondents said that they had taken Amrit but no longer practice (2% females and 6% males).

About a quarter of respondents said that they intended to take Amrit (20% females and 28% males), and this was reflected in all age groups except those aged 65+, where the percentage of Amritdharis is already the highest.

Figure 3.1 Are you a practising Amritdhari Sikh?




Dastar (Turban) wearing Sikhs

35% of respondents said that they wear a dastar (turban). This is comprised of 8% of females and 62% of males. Those aged 65+ years have the highest level of dastar wearing, at 40%, slightly more than the 39% of those aged 20–34 years. Those in the middle age groups (35–49 and 50–64 years of age)

have a lower level of dastar wearing, at about 30% each. This trend reflects the situation for those who have taken and observe Amrit, as shown in Figure 3.1, and suggests a restoration of the importance of Sikh identity within this generation.

Figure 3.2 Do you wear a dastar?



The BSR 2025 survey data shows a generally positive picture of employment and educational attainment within the Sikh community, while also highlighting important variations by gender and age.


Employment Status

Overall employment levels are strong, with 54% of respondents in full-time employment and a further 11% self-employed, reflecting the continued emphasis on economic participation and entrepreneurship within the community. Unemployment remains low at 4%, broadly consistent across both men and women. (Figure 4.1)

There are, however, distinct gender differences in patterns of work. Men are more likely to be in full-time employment (57% compared to 50% of women) and self-employment (14% vs 9%). Women are significantly more likely to be in part-time employment (13% compared to 5% of men), which may reflect caring responsibilities, cultural expectations, or structural barriers within the labour market. Retirement levels are similar across genders, at around 12%.

Age-based analysis shows expected differences between age groups. Full-time employment is highest among those aged 20–49, reaching 65–68%, before declining in later years. The 35–64 age groups show the highest levels of self-employment (15–16%), reinforcing the long-established role of Sikh-owned businesses. Among those aged 19 and below, the majority (61%) identify as students, while two-thirds of those aged 65+ are retired.

Figure 4.1 Employment Status




Type of Employment

The sectoral breakdown reveals both gendered occupational patterns and generational shifts (Table 4.2). Women are disproportionately represented in healthcare (17%) and teaching and education (15%), compared to 10% and 4% respectively for men. These findings align with broader UK labour market trends but also point to the significant contribution Sikh women make to public-facing and caring professions.

Men are far more likely to work in IT and technology (14% vs 2%), as well as construction and building services, reflecting both skills pipelines and occupational segregation. Participation in public service, charity and social work is relatively balanced across genders, at just under 9% overall.

Across age groups, healthcare remains a consistently important sector, particularly among those aged 35–49. All age groups up to 64 years of age show high representation of 9% - 10% in IT and technology, suggesting adaptation to emerging labour market opportunities. Older respondents are more likely to fall into the “other sectors” category, reflecting both historical employment patterns and the diversity of earlier career paths.

Figure 4.2 Type of employment: Current or previously, if now retired or not working




Educational Attainment

Educational outcomes remain a key strength. Over 65% of respondents hold a university degree or higher, including 23% with a Master’s degree and 3% with a PhD. Women are slightly more likely to hold a first degree, while men marginally outnumber women at postgraduate level, though the differences are relatively small.

Age-based analysis highlights a clear generational uplift in higher education participation. Nearly half of those aged 20–34 hold a university degree, and over a quarter have a Master’s qualification. In contrast, older age groups show higher proportions with vocational qualifications or GCSE-level attainment, reflecting historical access to higher education rather than current performance.

Encouragingly, the proportion reporting no qualifications is very low (2%), though this rises among those aged 65+ to 6%, underscoring the need for inclusive lifelong learning and skills recognition, particularly for older migrants with foreign qualifications.

Figure 4.3 What is your highest level of education/qualification?



Summary

Taken together, the findings point to a Sikh community that is highly engaged in education and employment, with strong professional representation and low unemployment. Nonetheless, persistent gender differences in employment type and sector, alongside evolving generational trends, suggest that targeted policy interventions - particularly around childcare, flexible working, and access to high-growth sectors - could further unlock the community's economic potential.




The BSR survey highlights both shifts in party support and growing uncertainty within British Sikhs when comparing how respondents voted in the 2024 General Election with how they say they would vote now.

2024 General Election: Reported Voting

In the 2024 General Election, Labour was the most supported party, attracting around 40% of the vote, with little variation by gender (Figure 5.1). The Conservative Party followed at approximately 20%, with support increasing steadily with age and peaking among those aged 65 and over. Younger adults were more likely to support Labour or smaller parties, such as the Green Party.

Gender differences were limited for the main parties, though men were notably more likely to vote for Reform UK, while women showed slightly higher support for the Green Party. Overall, around one quarter of respondents either did not vote or preferred not to say, indicating a significant level of disengagement or reluctance to disclose voting behaviour.

Figure 5.1 Who did you vote for in the 2024 General Election?




Current Voting Intentions

When asked how they would vote if a General Election were held now, the data shows a marked decline in declared support for Labour (Figure 5.2), falling from around 40% to 18%, while Conservative support remains broadly stable at around 18%. This results in a narrowing gap between the two main parties and suggests a weakening of Labour's previously dominant position.

Support for Reform UK increases substantially, particularly among men and younger respondents, while women remain more likely to express support for the Green Party or smaller parties focused on equality and social issues. Across all demographics, there is a noticeable rise in those who say they would not vote or prefer not to state a preference, reaching over one third of respondents.

Age-based patterns persist, with younger respondents displaying greater political fragmentation and disengagement, while older respondents, especially those aged 65+, continue to show higher levels of support for the Conservative Party and lower levels of non-voting.


Figure 5.2 Who would you vote for if there was a General Election now?



Taken together, the comparison suggests a Sikh electorate that is less settled in its political alignment than at the time of the 2024 election. While Labour remains an important point of reference, support appears more fluid, with increased openness to alternative parties and a growing proportion expressing uncertainty or disengagement. These trends underline the importance of sustained and meaningful political engagement with Sikh communities beyond election cycles.

Political Engagement

Figure 5.3 How actively do you engage with politics?



The BSR survey reports that the majority of Sikh respondents engage with politics at least to some extent, though levels of active participation remain limited, with most engagement taking the form of information consumption rather than direct involvement (Figure 5.3).

Just under half of respondents (44%) describe themselves as somewhat active, typically engaging through reading news or discussing political issues. A further 29% report occasional engagement, such as voting or following key issues. By contrast, only 6% identify as very active, indicating that direct participation in political events, campaigns or meetings remains relatively uncommon within the community.

At the lower end of the engagement spectrum, around 20% report limited or no engagement, including 11% who are not very active and 9% who do not engage at all. This mirrors earlier findings on voting behaviour, where a substantial minority expressed disengagement or uncertainty.

Men report slightly higher levels of political engagement than women. Men are more likely to describe themselves as very active or somewhat active (54% compared to 46% of women), while women are more likely to report occasional engagement. Levels of complete disengagement are similar across genders, suggesting that differences relate more to intensity of engagement rather than participation versus non-participation.

Political engagement generally increases with age, particularly in terms of regular, ongoing engagement. Respondents aged 35 and over are most likely to describe themselves as somewhat active, rising to nearly half of those aged 65+. In contrast, those aged 20–34 show higher levels of occasional or low engagement, with the highest proportion reporting that they are not very active.

Interestingly, the youngest adult group also records one of the highest proportions describing themselves as very active, suggesting a polarisation among younger Sikhs between those who are highly engaged and those who are largely disengaged.


Overall, the data points to a Sikh community that is politically aware but unevenly engaged. While most respondents follow politics at least occasionally, relatively few participate actively, and younger adults in particular display mixed patterns of engagement. These findings reinforce the importance of accessible and relevant political engagement pathways that move beyond voting alone and encourage sustained participation across age groups.

Trust in Government

The BSR survey asked respondents how much trust they have in the UK government to act in the best interests of the Sikh community. The findings indicate low overall levels of trust in the UK government's ability to act in the best interests of the Sikh community, with scepticism outweighing confidence across all demographic groups (Figure 5.4).

Figure 5.4

How much trust do you have in the UK government to act in the best interests of the Sikh community?



Overall Levels of Trust

Only 19% of respondents express some or a great deal of trust, while a clear majority - nearly 60% - report little or no trust at all. A further 21% remain neutral or unsure, suggesting uncertainty alongside dissatisfaction. The very small proportion expressing a great deal of trust (under 4%) highlights the depth of concern regarding political representation and responsiveness.

Men report slightly higher levels of trust than women, with 22% of men indicating some or a great deal of trust compared to 15% of women. However, men are also marginally more likely to report no trust at all, pointing to more polarised views. Women are more likely to express little trust, reinforcing an overall pattern of scepticism rather than outright disengagement.

Trust in government increases with age, though it remains limited even among older respondents. Those aged 65 and over are the most trusting group, with over 30% expressing some or a great deal of trust, and significantly lower levels of outright distrust. In contrast, younger adults (20–34 and 35–49) display the highest levels of distrust, with around one third reporting no trust at all.

Neutral or unsure responses remain relatively consistent across age groups, suggesting that uncertainty is widespread and not confined to any single generation.

Summary


Overall, the data points to a Sikh community that is deeply sceptical of government intentions, particularly among younger and middle-aged respondents. While older Sikhs demonstrate relatively higher trust, confidence remains fragile across all age groups. These findings underline the importance of sustained engagement, meaningful consultation, and visible policy outcomes if trust between government and the Sikh community is to be rebuilt. To some extent, these findings are not unique to Sikhs and similar trends have been noted in respect of the whole UK population.

Satisfaction with Political Representation

British Sikhs were asked about their satisfaction with the current political representation of Sikhs in the UK. The findings indicate low levels of satisfaction currently, with dissatisfaction outweighing satisfaction across most demographic groups and a substantial proportion expressing neutrality.

Figure 5.5

How satisfied are you with the current political representation of Sikhs in the UK?



Overall Levels of Satisfaction

Only around 15% of respondents report being either satisfied or very satisfied with Sikh political representation. By contrast, nearly half (46%) express dissatisfaction, including 16% who are very dissatisfied. A further 38% adopt a neutral position, suggesting either uncertainty about representation or limited visibility of Sikh political advocacy at a national level.

The small proportion reporting that they are very satisfied (just over 3%) highlights the limited confidence in existing structures of political representation.

Men are more likely than women to express satisfaction, with 21% of men reporting satisfaction or high satisfaction compared to 10% of women. Women are more likely to express dissatisfaction, particularly at the “dissatisfied” level, indicating greater concern about the effectiveness or inclusivity of current representation.

Levels of neutrality are similar across genders, reinforcing the view that many respondents remain unconvinced rather than firmly aligned in either direction.

Satisfaction with Sikh political representation increases modestly with age. Respondents aged 65 and over are the most positive, with around 21% expressing satisfaction, and the lowest proportion reporting being very dissatisfied. In contrast, those aged 35–49 show the highest levels of dissatisfaction, with over 50% expressing dissatisfaction or strong dissatisfaction.

Younger adults (20–34) are more likely to select a neutral response, which may reflect lower awareness of political representation structures or more limited engagement with formal political channels.

Summary

Overall, the data suggests a Sikh community that is largely unconvinced by current models of political representation. While outright dissatisfaction is widespread, high levels of neutrality point to an opportunity to improve visibility, accountability, and engagement. Addressing these concerns may be critical to rebuilding trust and strengthening political participation within the community.



Meeting a Partner or Spouse

This section explores relationships and family dynamics within the Sikh community in the UK, set against the context of a community now settled for three or four generations in many families. It examines how respondents met their current or previous partners or spouses, and considers the birthplaces of partners, reflecting shifting international ties over time. The section also reviews the duration of relationships and, where relationships have ended, the main reasons for breakdown, highlighting how relationship patterns and expectations have evolved from those common among first-generation migrants to those shaping contemporary Sikh family life in the UK.

BSR 2025 asked respondents how they met their current or previous partners or spouses (Table 6.1). The results highlight the continued importance of family-arranged partnerships within the Sikh community, alongside evolving trends in social and digital meeting contexts.

Table 6.1 How did you meet your current or previous partner/spouse?	By gender		By age group				Total
	Female	Male	20–34	35–49	50–64	65+	
Through family arrangement (including arranged marriage)	47%	54%	22%	41%	63%	79%	51%
Through work, school, or social settings	18%	16%	24%	20%	13%	6%	17%
Through friends or acquaintances	15%	11%	22%	12%	12%	8%	13%
Through dating apps or social media	13%	11%	26%	17%	4%	0%	12%
Through a dating or introduction service	3%	4%	3%	4%	4%	1%	3%
Other	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to say	4%	4%	3%	6%	3%	5%	5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Just over half (51%) report meeting their partner through family arrangements, including arranged marriages, making it the most common route. A smaller proportion met through work, school, or social settings (17%), friends or acquaintances (13%), or dating apps/social media (12%). Very few used formal introduction services (3%) or reported other methods. These patterns suggest a blend of traditional and contemporary approaches to partnership formation.

Men are slightly more likely than women to report family-arranged partnerships (54% vs 47%), while women are marginally more likely to meet partners through work, school, or social settings. Use of dating apps and social media is similar across genders, indicating growing acceptance of digital methods for relationship formation among both men and women.

Patterns vary significantly by age group, reflecting the different generations of Sikhs now settled in Britain. About a quarter of younger respondents (20–34 years of age) most commonly report meeting partners through dating apps/social media, another quarter through work, school or social settings. 22% met through family arrangements, and another 22% through friends and acquaintances. In contrast, older age groups are overwhelmingly likely to have met partners through family arrangements, rising to 79% among those aged 65+. Use of dating apps declines sharply with age, reflecting both generational familiarity with digital platforms and changing social norms.

Summary

The data illustrates a dual pattern of relationship formation in the Sikh community. Arranged marriages remain significant among the young and dominated the way that older adults met their partners. Younger Sikhs are increasingly meeting partners through social networks and digital platforms. This reflects both continuity in cultural traditions and adaptation to modern social contexts.

Birthplace of Partners or Spouses

British Sikhs now include many who were born here, namely second, third and fourth generation descendants of those who first came here during the 20th Century. However, there are also many who were born in India, East Africa and other countries. BSR asked respondents, if they were married or in a relationship, where their spouse or partner was born (Table 6.2).

Table 6.2 What is/was the birthplace of your partner or spouse?	<i>By gender</i>		<i>By age group</i>				Total
	Female	Male	20–34	35–49	50–64	65+	
UK	54%	49%	62%	65%	54%	10%	52%
India	32%	41%	30%	29%	34%	63%	36%
Kenya	8%	7%	0%	2%	10%	23%	7%
Other	2%	0%	4%	1%	0%	0%	1%
Prefer not to say	3%	3%	4%	3%	2%	4%	3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Just over half of partners (52%) were born in the UK, while 36% were born in India, and a smaller proportion in Kenya (7%). Very few report other countries (1%) or prefer not to say (3%). This indicates that while UK-born partnerships are now the majority, transnational marriages, particularly with partners born in India, remain significant.

Men are more likely than women to have partners born in India (41% vs 32%), while women slightly more often report UK-born partners (54% vs 49% of men). Birthplaces in Kenya and other countries are broadly similar across genders, suggesting minimal gendered differentiation outside of the India - UK connections.

Age-based analysis demonstrates strong generational trends. Partners of younger respondents (20–49) are predominantly UK-born (62–65%), while among those aged 50–64, the proportion falls to 54%, and only 10% among those aged 65+. Conversely, older respondents are more likely to have partners born in India, rising to 63% among the oldest cohort. Partners born in Kenya are more common among the 50–64 and 65+ groups, reflecting historical East African migration patterns. Younger adults are more likely to have partners born in the UK.

The data shows a clear generational shift toward UK-born partnerships within the Sikh community. While transnational marriages, particularly with partners from India, remain important, younger generations are increasingly forming relationships within the UK, reflecting both changing migration patterns and the integration of the community across generations.

Duration of Relationships


In order to examine the **long-term nature of partnerships** within the Sikh community, British Sikhs were asked how long they have been in their current or previous relationship (Table 6.3).

Table 6.3 How long have you been in your current or previous relationship?	<i>By gender</i>		<i>By age group</i>				Total
	Female	Male	20–34	35–49	50–64	65+	
Less than 6 months	1%	1%	2%	1%	1%	0%	1%
6 months to 1 year	0%	1%	1%	1%	0%	0%	1%
1 - 2 years	2%	4%	12%	1%	2%	0%	3%
2 - 5 years	9%	9%	31%	7%	2%	1%	9%
5 - 10 years	14%	14%	40%	14%	4%	1%	14%
10 - 20 years	23%	23%	12%	45%	12%	5%	23%
More than 20 years	51%	48%	2%	31%	80%	94%	49%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Nearly half of respondents (49%) report being in their current or previous relationship for more than 20 years, with a further 23% in relationships lasting 10–20 years. Shorter-term relationships are relatively uncommon, with just 1–3% lasting under two years. The length of partnerships will, of course, also vary by age since older people are more likely to have been married longer. However, generally, the statistics indicate that Sikh partnerships are predominantly long-standing, consistent with cultural emphasis on marital stability and lifelong commitment. Relationship durations are broadly similar between men and women, with only minor differences.

Age is of course strongly linked to relationship length to date. Younger respondents (20–34 years of age) are primarily in relationships of 2–5 and 5–10 years, reflecting their life stages. 45% of those aged 35–49 have had relationships lasting 10–20 years and another 31% for more than 20 years. 80% of those aged 50–64 and 94% of those aged 65+ have been in relationships lasting more than 20 years.

Overall, the Sikh community demonstrates remarkable relationship stability, with the majority of adults in long-term partnerships, particularly in older age groups. While younger adults have naturally been in shorter length relationships so far, the broader pattern highlights enduring marital commitments, consistent with cultural and generational norms around family and partnership.



Reasons for Relationship Breakdown

Overall, marriages and partnerships are strong and long-lasting within the British Sikh community. However, there are relationships that break down and end. 9% of respondents have reported that they are either divorced or separated from a marriage, or separated from a cohabiting or non-cohabiting relationship. The BSR 2025 survey asked those Sikhs whose relationships had ended, what were the reasons for the breakdown (Table 6.4). Respondents could state more than one reason if they wished to. The statistics highlight key factors contributing to relationship endings in the Sikh community, with notable gender and age differences.

Table 6.4 What were the main reasons for ending a relationship?	<i>By gender</i>		<i>By age group</i>				Total
	Female	Male	20–34	35–49	50–64	65+	
Emotional or physical abuse	45%	20%	31%	37%	36%	36%	36%
Differences in values or life goals	26%	45%	52%	33%	32%	28%	33%
Unfaithfulness or lack of trust	28%	32%	44%	27%	33%	21%	30%
Too many arguments	14%	39%	18%	32%	15%	30%	23%
Alcohol or drug abuse	21%	8%	13%	30%	15%	0%	16%
Financial problems or disagreements	11%	17%	13%	21%	7%	12%	13%
Other	7%	5%	0%	10%	7%	0%	6%
Prefer not to say	22%	11%	13%	16%	24%	12%	18%

The most common reasons for ending relationships are emotional or physical abuse (36%), differences in values or life goals (33%), and unfaithfulness or lack of trust (30%). Other contributing factors include too many arguments (23%), alcohol or drug abuse (16%), and financial disagreements (13%). Around 18% of respondents preferred not to disclose their reasons, reflecting the sensitivity of these issues.

Women are more likely than men to cite emotional or physical abuse (45% vs 20%) and alcohol or drug abuse (21% vs 8%), highlighting experiences of victimisation. Men are more likely to report differences in values or life goals (45% vs 26%) and too many arguments (39% vs 14%) as reasons for separation. Reports of unfaithfulness or lack of trust are broadly similar across genders, affecting around 30% of respondents.

The factors cited as causing breakdown of relationships vary significantly by age group. Younger adults (20–34) are most likely to cite differences in values or life goals (52%), unfaithfulness (44%), and emotional abuse (31%). Middle-aged adults (35–49) report emotional abuse (37%), differences in values (33%), and too many arguments (32%). Older respondents (50+) more often highlight emotional abuse, differences in values, and unfaithfulness, but the relative importance of financial problems declines. Emotional and physical abuse remains consistently cited across all adult age groups.

To summarise, relationship breakdowns in the Sikh community are shaped by a combination of abuse, trust issues, and incompatibility of values, with gendered patterns reflecting differing experiences of abuse and relational conflict. Age also plays a role, with younger adults emphasising differences in life goals and fidelity, and older adults reporting enduring challenges related to abuse and compatibility. These findings underscore the importance of relationship support, education, and safeguarding measures tailored to community needs.



The BSR team have been asked by experts supporting women through pregnancy and childbirth, to collect some data relating to the experience of those who have had children. For those who suffered miscarriages or stillbirths, the survey asks about their experience of support and coping with life afterwards. This section summarises the findings.

Pregnancy Experience

Survey respondents were asked if they, or their current or previous partner, had ever been pregnant (Table 7.1).

Table 7.1 Have you or your current or previous partner ever been pregnant?	<i>By gender</i>		<i>By age group</i>				Total
	Female	Male	20–34	35–49	50–64	65+	
Yes	74%	76%	40%	83%	86%	81%	75%
No	21%	18%	55%	14%	10%	9%	20%
Not sure	1%	1%	1%	1%	0%	1%	1%
Prefer not to say	4%	5%	4%	3%	4%	9%	5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Overall, 75% of respondents report that they or their current or previous partner have been pregnant, while 20% report no pregnancy experience and a small minority are unsure (1%) or prefer not to say (5%). This indicates that pregnancy and parenthood are a common feature of relationships within the community.

Responses are broadly similar between women (74% 'yes') and men (76% 'yes'), suggesting consistency in reporting between partners. Slightly higher "prefer not to say" responses among men (5% vs 4%) may reflect privacy or sensitivity concerns.

Pregnancy experience varies markedly by age, reflecting life stage. Among those aged 20–34, 40% report pregnancy experience, increasing sharply in the 35–49 group (83%) and remaining high among 50–64 (86%) and 65+ (81%) respondents.


Pregnancy is a common life experience within the Sikh community, with near-universal prevalence among adults over 35. Patterns align with expected generational and life-stage differences, illustrating both the timing of family formation and the consistency of parenthood across genders.



Number of Biological Children

The survey asked how many biological children respondents have (Figure 7.2). The statistics provide insights into family size within the Sikh community, showing clear patterns by age and consistency across genders.

Figure 7.2
How many biological children do you currently have?



The most common response is from those with two children (40%), followed by three children (17%) and one child (16%). Larger families of four or more children are less common (6%). Around 19% of respondents report having no children, while a small proportion preferred not to disclose (2%). Patterns are broadly similar for women and men, reflecting parity in family size and consistency in reporting across genders.

Family size corresponds strongly with age. Younger respondents (20–34) group is mixed, with 62% having no children, 22% reporting one child and 14% reporting 2 or more children. Those aged 35–49 most commonly have two children (50%), with smaller numbers having one or three children. Older adults (50–64 and 65+) are more likely to have three or more children, reflecting historical trends toward larger families. Notably, a small proportion of older respondents still report one or two children, showing variation in family size within cohorts. Only 3% of those aged 65+ report having no children.

Summary

The data highlights that two-child families are the most common in the Sikh community, with larger families more common among older generations. Family size increases predictably with age, and patterns are consistent across genders, reflecting both contemporary and historical family formation trends.



Miscarriage and Stillbirth Experience

BSR asked British Sikhs, whether they, their current or previous partner has ever experienced a miscarriage or still birth (Table 7.3).

Table 7.3 Have you or your current or previous partner experienced a miscarriage or stillbirth?	<i>By gender</i>		<i>By age group</i>				Total
	Female	Male	20–34	35–49	50–64	65+	
Yes	29%	24%	7%	30%	32%	30%	26%
No	67%	70%	87%	63%	64%	65%	69%
Not sure	0%	2%	1%	2%	2%	0%	1%
Prefer not to say	4%	4%	5%	5%	2%	5%	4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

About a quarter of respondents report that they or their current or previous partner have experienced a miscarriage or stillbirth. The majority (69%) report no such experience, while a small proportion are unsure (1%) or preferred not to disclose (4%). These figures indicate that pregnancy loss is a relatively common experience, affecting about one in four respondents.

Women report slightly higher rates (29%) compared to men (24%), reflecting direct experience and/or awareness of the event. Reporting of “not sure” is minimal but slightly higher among men (2%), consistent with indirect experience of partner pregnancy loss. Preference not to disclose is similar across genders (4%).

Incidence differs with age, reflecting cumulative pregnancy experience. Among 20–34-year-olds, only 7% report miscarriage or stillbirth, whereas rates increase to 30%–32% for all groups above 35 years of age.

In summary, pregnancy loss affects a notable minority of the Sikh community, with prevalence increasing with age. These findings underline the importance of support services, counselling, and awareness around miscarriage and stillbirth within the community.



Experiences Following Miscarriage or Stillbirth


Those who have suffered miscarriage or stillbirth were asked for their views on various statements related to their subsequent experience including support from partners, employers, health professionals and others, and also how they felt subsequently (Figure 7.4).

Figure 7.4


Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements about your miscarriage or stillbirth experience afterwards.

by gender Female Male Total


I felt supported by my partner




I felt supported by others who knew







I felt supported by my doctors or healthcare provider



I felt supported by my employer




by age group 20-34 35-49 50-64 65+ Total




by gender Female Male Total



I felt alone





by age group 20-34 35-49 50-64 65+ Total



I thought I was to blame



I was scared about trying for another baby



The data highlights the emotional and practical experiences of Sikhs in the UK following miscarriage or stillbirth, showing differences by gender and age across support networks, feelings of isolation, self-blame, and fears about future pregnancies.

Support from Partners

Overall, 41% of respondents strongly agreed they felt supported by their partner, with 22% agreeing. Women reported lower strong support (33%) than men (52%), indicating differences in perception or experience. Support tends to be strongest among 20–34-year-olds (71%), declining in older age groups, reflecting generational and relational dynamics.

Support from Others

Around 54% (strongly agree + agree) felt supported by friends, family, or acquaintances, with women and men reporting broadly similar levels. Younger adults (aged 20–34) felt most supported (66% strongly agree), while older groups reported more neutral or mixed experiences.

Support from Healthcare Providers

Support from doctors or healthcare providers was generally positive: 49% strongly agreed or agreed overall. Younger respondents (20–34) were more likely to report agreement (75% combined), while those aged 50–64 were less likely to strongly agree (6%), suggesting perceptions of support varies by age and expectations of care.

Support from Employers

Fewer respondents felt strong support from employers (12% strongly agree; 21% agree), with 39% neutral, reflecting limited workplace involvement in post-miscarriage care. Younger adults (aged 20–34) reported higher strong support (42%), likely linked to more recent workplace policies or awareness.

Feelings of Isolation

A notable proportion of respondents felt alone following miscarriage or stillbirth (36% strongly agree/agree combined). Women reported slightly higher levels of isolation than men. Isolation was highest among respondents aged 50–64 (36% neutral), reflecting changes in awareness of the support needed over time, with their experiences probably being a few decades earlier.

Self-Blame

Experiences of self-blame were significant: 28% strongly disagreed they were to blame, while 22% agreed, and 6% strongly agreed, showing mixed feelings. Women were more likely to feel personal responsibility (38% agree/strongly agree combined) than men (15% combined). Younger adults (aged 20–34 and 35–49) reported higher self-blame (29% and 37% agree or strongly agree), compared with the older age groups.

Fear About Future Pregnancies

Concerns about trying for another baby were common: 39% strongly agreed or agreed, with roughly equal proportions between women and men. Younger adults (20–34) were slightly less fearful (37% combined) compared to middle-aged adults (35–49, 52%), indicating fear may increase with repeated experiences or awareness of medical risks.

Summary

Overall, the data shows complex emotional and social dynamics following miscarriage or stillbirth within the Sikh community:

- Partner support is generally strong, especially among younger Sikhs.
- Support from friends, family, and healthcare providers is positive but varies by age.
- Employer support remains limited, highlighting an area for policy and awareness improvement.
- Feelings of isolation, self-blame, and fear about future pregnancies are prevalent, underlining the need for targeted mental health support, counselling, and culturally sensitive care.

These findings reinforce that miscarriage and stillbirth are not only medical experiences but also profoundly social and emotional events, requiring comprehensive support networks.



Geopolitical Concerns and Community Safety

At the time that the BSR 2025 survey was live, there had been tensions and fears of a conflict between India and Pakistan. The survey asked respondents about any concerns that they may have about impacts of such geopolitical tensions involving India on Sikhs living in the UK.

Respondents expressed considerable concern about the impact of geopolitical tensions involving India, with a focus on misunderstanding, safety, and communal tensions (Table 8.1).

Across the community, the most prominent concerns were:

- Fear that Sikh communities in the UK could be misunderstood or targeted (54%)
- Worry about misinformation or fake news causing panic or hostility (50%)
- Concern about rising anti-Sikh sentiment or confusion about Sikh identity (49%)
- Concern for the safety of family and friends in Punjab or nearby regions (45%)

Fewer respondents are worried about disruption to visits or pilgrimage plans (34%), while only 5% report no specific concerns. This indicates that the majority of the community is attentive to both local and transnational impacts of geopolitical events.

Table 8.1 What concerns, if any, do you have about how geopolitical tensions involving India may affect Sikhs in the UK?	By gender		By age group				Total
	Female	Male	20–34	35–49	50–64	65+	
Fear that Sikh communities in the UK could be misunderstood or targeted	56%	52%	55%	55%	56%	48%	54%
Worry about misinformation or fake news on social media causing panic or hostility	51%	49%	51%	51%	53%	42%	50%
Concern about rising anti-Sikh sentiment or confusion about Sikh identity	50%	48%	52%	51%	49%	35%	49%
Concern for the safety of family and friends living in Punjab or nearby regions	47%	43%	53%	48%	40%	37%	45%
Concern about attacks on Sikh religious sites in India, such as the Golden Temple	46%	41%	48%	42%	44%	34%	43%
Anxiety over the potential for hate crimes or communal tensions within the UK	45%	39%	46%	44%	44%	29%	42%
Fear that the situation could disrupt visits to Punjab or affect pilgrimage plans	35%	34%	41%	37%	34%	22%	34%
No specific concerns at this time	5%	5%	5%	5%	4%	8%	5%

Women express slightly higher levels of concern than men across most categories, including fear of misunderstanding or targeting (56% vs 52%) and concern over misinformation (51% vs 49%). Differences are modest, suggesting broadly shared perceptions of risk and vulnerability across genders.

Concerns vary by age group. Working age adults (aged 20–64) report consistently high concern across all categories, particularly regarding family safety, misinformation, and communal tensions, reflecting both direct ties to India and awareness of UK societal risks. Older respondents (65+) are somewhat less concerned across most issues, although still attentive to community targeting (48%) and attacks on religious sites (34%).

The Sikh community in the UK demonstrates high awareness and concern regarding the potential effects of geopolitical tensions involving India. Concerns encompass both domestic safety and identity issues as well as transnational impacts, particularly for family and religious sites. While women and younger adults report slightly higher levels of anxiety, overall patterns indicate a community-wide vigilance toward both misinformation and the risk of communal tensions.



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British Sikh Report 2025

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British Sikh Report 2025

The British Sikh Report (BSR) has been published annually since 2013. It is based on a survey of Sikhs living in the UK, gathering information about views on their faith, and on topical British issues – political, economic, social and cultural.

British Sikh Report website: <http://www.britishsikhreport.org>

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